Much of the Internet has been affected by the Heartbleed vulnerability in the widely used OpenSSL server-side software. The bug effectively allows anyone to collect random data from the memory of machines running the affected software, which was about 60% of encrypted sites worldwide. A massive cleanup effort ensued, but the vulnerability has been in the software for two years, so there's no telling how much information was stolen in the interim.
The OpenSSL software is used not only to encrypt HTTPS connections to web servers but also to generate the certificates that undergird those connections as well as many PKIs. Since data could have been stolen over a period of two years, it should be assumed that certificates, usernames and passwords have been stolen as well. Pessimism is the only way to be sure.1
In fact, any data that was loaded into memory on a server running a pre-Heartbleed version of the OpenSSL software is potentially compromised.
We should all generate new certificates, ensuring that the root certificate from which we generate has also been re-generated and is clean. We should also choose new passwords for all affected sites. I use LastPass to manage my passwords, which makes it much easier to use long, complicated and most importantly unique passwords. If you're not already using a password manager, now would be a good time to start.
And this goes especially for those who tend to reuse their password on different sites. If one of those sites is cracked, then the hacker can use that same username/password combination on other popular sites and get into your stuff everywhere instead of just on the compromised site.
Though there are those who are blaming open-source software, we should instead blame ourselves for using software of unknown quality to run our most trusted connections. That the software was designed and built without the required quality controls is a different issue. People are going to write bad software. If you use their free software and it ends up not being as secure as advertised, you have to take at least some of the blame on yourself.
Instead, the security experts and professionals who've written so many articles and done so many reviews over the years touting the benefits of Open SSL should take more of the blame. They are the ones who misused their reputations by touting poorly written software to which they had source-code access, but were too lazy to perform a serious evaluation.
An advantage of open-source software is that we can at least pinpoint exactly when a bug appeared. Another is that the entire codebase is available to all, so others can jump in and try to fix it. Sure, it would have been nice if the expert security programmers of the world had jumped in earlier, but better late than never.
The site OpenSSL Rampage follows the efforts of the OpenBSD team to refactor and modernize the OpenSSL codebase. They are documenting their progress live on Tumblr, which collects commit messages, tweets, blog posts and official security warnings that result from their investigations and fixes.
They are working on a fork and are making radical changes, so it's unlikely that the changes will be taken up in the official OpenSSL fork but perhaps a new TLS/SSL tool will be available soon.2
The messages tell tales of support for extinct operating systems like VMS, whose continued support makes for much more complicated code to support current OSs. This complexity, in turn, hides further misuses of
malloc as well as misuses of custom buffer-allocation schemes that the OpenSSL team came up with because "
malloc is too slow". Sometimes memory is freed twice for good measure.
The article Today's bugs have BRANDS? Be still my bleeding heart [logo] by Verity Stob has a (partially) humorous take on the most recent software errors that have reared their ugly heads. As also mentioned in that article, the Heartbleed Explained by Randall Munroe cartoon shows the Heartbleed issue well, even for non-technical people.
This is all sounds horrible and one wonders how the software runs at all. Don't worry: the code base contains a tremendous amount of cruft that is never used. It is compiled and still included, but it acts as a cozy nest of code that is wrapped around the actual code.
There are vast swaths of script files that haven't been used for years, that can build versions of the software under compilers and with options that haven't been seen on this planet since before .. well, since before Tumblr or Facebook. For example, there's no need to retain a forest of macros at the top of many header files for the Metrowerks compiler for PowerPC on OS9. No reason at all.
There are also incompatibly licensed components in regular use as well as those associated with components that don't seem to be used anymore.
There are compiler options for increasing resiliency that seem to work. Turning these off, however, yields an application that crashes immediately. There are clearly no tests for any of these modes. OpenSSL sounds like a classically grown system that has little in the way of code conventions, patterns or architecture. There seems to be no one who regularly cleans out and decides which code to keep and which to make obsolete. And, even when code is deemed obsolete, it remains in the code base over a decade later.
This is to say nothing of how their encryption algorithm actually works. There are tales on that web site of the OpenSSL developers desperately having tried to keep entropy high by mixing in the current time every once in a while. Or even mixing in bits of the private key for good measure.
The current OpenSSL codebase seems to be a minefield for security reviewers or for reviewers of any kind. A codebase like this is also terrible for new developers, the onboarding of which you want to encourage in such a widely used, distributed, open-source project.
Instead, the current state of the code says: don't touch, you don't know what to change or remove because clearly the main developers don't know either. The last person who knew may have died or left the project years ago.
It's clear that the code has not been reviewed in the way that it should be. Code on this level and for this purpose needs good developers/reviewers who constantly consider most of the following points during each review:
It sounds like it is high time that someone does what the BSD team is doing. A spring cleaning can be very healthy for software, especially once it's reached a certain age. That goes double for software that was blindly used by 60% of the encrypted web sites in the world.
It's wonderful that OpenSSL exists. Without it, we wouldn't be as encrypted as we are. But the apparent state of this code bespeaks of failure to manage on all levels. The developers of software this important must be of higher quality. They must be the best of the best, not just anyone who read about encryption on Wikipedia and "wants to help". Wanting to help is nice, but you have to know what you're doing.
OpenSSL will be with us for a while. It may be crap code and it may lack automated tests, but it has been manually (and possibly regression-) tested and used a lot, so it has earned a certain badge of reliability and predictability. The state of the code means only that future changes are riskier, not necessarily that the current software is not usable.
Knowing that the code is badly written should make everyone suspicious of patches -- which we now know are likely to break something in that vast pile of C code -- but not suspicious of the officially supported versions from Debian and Ubuntu (for example). Even if the developer team of OpenSSL doesn't test a lot (or not automatically for all options, at any rate -- they may just be testing the "happy path"), the major Linux distros do. So there's that comfort, at least.
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